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Rethinking ‘Tribalism’

Indigenous wisdom for our polarized times.

By Devaka Premawardhana

Tribalism is here to stay—the term, anyway, and maybe also the reality it is meant to name.1 Talk of tribalism took off around the mid-2010s when American social life went from partisan to polarized and when politics congealed around identity—on both the left and the right. In choosing “tribalism” as the 2017 word of the year, the late linguist Geoffrey Nunberg summarized the shift well. Political tribalists are “people whose partisan identity has become so central that it determines whom they’re willing to date and what brands of pizza and coffee makers they buy, not to mention which news stories they’re willing to believe.”2 Accompanying this condition are higher levels of suspicion and animosity, distrust and disgust, toward those seen to belong to opposing tribes. Nearly a decade on, tribalism may be the word not of any one year, but the word of our times.

The day after former President Donald Trump was nearly assassinated, for example, Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey called out tribalism three times in a five-minute CNN interview.3 “I’m now convinced that the greatest threat to this nation is not some foreign adversary,” he said. “It’s the growing tribalism and hate within our own country where we find it hard to recognize that the lines that divide us are not nearly as strong as the ties that bind us.” Republicans and Democrats both called for unity and an end to the escalating cycle of rhetorical violence against political opponents. It was now clear that rhetorical violence could lead to physical violence, demonization could lead to death. It was a hopeful moment, yet within a week, slander and odium had returned.

Much has been written about the causes of increasing, and increasingly toxic, tribalism in the United States: the vitriol of particular political leaders, our two-party system and the way we draw electoral maps, the elitism of higher education, the popularity of cable news and talk radio, the filter bubbles of social media, the spread of disinformation, the explosion of white supremacy, the rise of identity politics. And a good amount has been proffered as pathways out of our tribal tendencies.

Chart

Pew Research Center chart from “Political Polarization in the American Public

 

Less discussed is the terminology itself. In much of the West, “tribal” often implies “savage,” evoking stereotypes of primitiveness and backwardness. It is worth noting, then, that many Native Americans and First Nations people around the world view their tribal affiliations positively and would recoil at the suggestion that to be tribal is to be uncivilized. But the trouble with the term goes further. It rests on flawed assumptions, specifically regarding how actual so-called tribal people have for the most part lived in the past and into the present. Real “tribes” have rarely been as polarized as many Americans today are.

What is worse, we may be missing a chance to draw from Indigenous wisdom—“tribal” wisdom—insights into how better to live in pluralistic communities. My own research in Africa, among what many would consider a tribal people, reveals that tribalism, properly understood, may actually be the antidote to our problem of polarization rather than another name for it.

 

One cool afternoon, in a rural village of around 300 families, I sat with some elders under the straw roof of the open-wall shed on one of their compounds. We were waiting for a team of development workers who were coming to conduct surveys on behalf of a foreign NGO. When those workers arrived, they did so in a caravan of Land Rovers—this in a part of Mozambique where everyone gets around on foot, or at best by bicycle. They carried thick notepads and wore polished threads, and for an hour they plied the elders with their scripted questions. My friends responded, but without opening up. They were not nearly as animated as I knew them ordinarily to be. It was not hard to understand why.

Though the visiting team had brought someone to translate into the local Makhuwa language, they used the kind of jargon—poverty indices, development targets—commonplace in the provincial capital but foreign to this outlying village. After an hour, making sure to leave enough sunlight left for their return to town, the development workers thanked us, climbed back into their 4x4s, and drove off. Only after the dust clouds had dissipated did my friends visibly relax. They proceeded immediately to make fun of their visitors, laughing at how “those whites” (akunya ala) talked—not only that they talked in such a complicated way, but also that they seemed to like talking so much.

It was striking that my Makhuwa friends referred to the development workers as akunya—and joked about them in front of me, an Asian American—because those workers were in fact dark-skinned Africans. They were “Black” by America’s racial classification system. But they were part of Mozambique’s educated and salaried elite, which in this village made them as foreign—and therefore as “white”—as any distant European.

Because the elders knew me to be in their village for the long haul, and to speak their language and embrace their way of life, I was made to feel welcome. They felt comfortable placing expectations on me, including the expectation that I would turn to them in my own times of need. This speaks to the one thing above all that I experienced in this relatively remote African village: the quality of hospitality, an eagerness to embrace, and in some way absorb, people like me whose origins obviously lie elsewhere. This is not to say hostilities and xenophobia are absent in societies such as this one. But the single, simple story of Africa as a heart of darkness, beset by conflict and chaos, needs no reinforcing. What I find to be far truer about the everyday lives of ordinary people in this community is their willingness to engage others and extend hospitality, and to share what little they have. Their default is to welcome anyone willing to meet them halfway—anyone willing to spend time, listen patiently, and show respect.

The people among whom I have lived on and off for over a decade, and with whom I continue to do research, are Makhuwa. This is the language they speak and the ethnic label by which they are known. It used to be that anthropologists classified “the Makhuwa of Mozambique”—just as they would “the Dogon of Mali” or “the Navajo of America’s Southwest”—as a “tribe,” as do many people today. In Africa, there are 2,000 such groupings, such tribes—each with its own language, social structure, traditions, customs, and beliefs. A tribe is meant to define not only the in-group but also to distinguish it from the out-group. Each tribe is supposed to be distinct from other tribes—isolated, cohesive, bounded. As such, tribes are often characterized by hostility toward and mistrust of the other. “Tribal strife” is not only violent and ugly; it is primordial and perpetual—Tutsi vs. Hutu, Luo vs. Kikuyu, etc.

This is the image of “tribe” pundits and politicians have in mind when discussing on our nightly news the deluge of discord—not in Africa, but in the United States. We Americans are increasingly fragmented into “tribes”: left vs. right, the coasts vs. the heartland, highly educated vs. undereducated, whites vs. people of color, religious vs. secular.

It would be easy to pin this problem of polarization on the right. As the past 10 years have shown over and over, Donald Trump’s loyalists are prone to an uncritical devotion to their leader. He can do no wrong and, in their view, the media and the justice system trying to hold him to account are corrupt and evil.

But it is not just in Trumpism that one finds blind allegiance and exclusionary behavior. As the legal scholar Amy Chua argues in her book Political Tribes, identity politics is common even among people like me and those in my academic circles. The truth is we self-segregate, and we largely fail to interact or intermarry with people of different educational or economic backgrounds.

Across the political spectrum, we have become increasingly insular and intolerant, irrational and primitive, in our loyalties and hostilities. Whether through the cable news channels we watch, the social media friends we keep, the neighborhoods we inhabit, or the affinity groups we join, we have effectively sorted ourselves into silos: closed communities that keep us ignorant, and often dismissive, of those beyond our bubbles.

This problem could well be called divisiveness or simply partisanship, but the metaphor of tribalism has caught on, and for good reason. “Tribalism” has a certain moral force. It calls attention to just how unthinking and uncivilized we have become, despite our claims to be modern.

 

We can thank colonial-era anthropology for bequeathing us the idea of “tribes” that is so commonplace today, defined as age-old social units, bounded, closed, and above all, primordial—there since the dawn of humanity. But this last point especially has come in for a radical rethinking in recent decades. What anthropologists today generally contend is that tribes did not exist until constructed as such during the relatively recent expansion of European empires, when colonial administrators, missionaries, and ethnographers encountered fluid groups composed of crosscutting identities and immediately sought to make sense of them.

Doing so meant sorting people into separate, hermetically sealed compartments—into “tribes.” This allowed Europeans to achieve some cognitive mastery over realities that must have struck them as bewilderingly complex, to make intelligible what was otherwise beyond their comprehension and control.

It is not that precolonial peoples lacked social and political structures. Rather, in most cases their associations looked more like loosely organized bands than tightly bounded “tribes.” The groupings that existed were dynamic and fluid—continually disaggregating and reconstituting, contracting and expanding through movement, marriage, and trade (and, yes, through war). The idea that they comprised closed, cohesive, and enduring groups—unified through such disparate factors as kinship, culture, language, politics—simply was not the case.

That is, not until they were categorized and consolidated as “tribes.” This occurred by many means: the appointing of chiefs for the purpose of colonial administration, the standardizing of languages for the purpose of Bible translation, and the codifying of culture for the purpose of scientific investigation.4 Colonized communities themselves played a role. Forced to make their claims and assert their rights within the newly introduced framework of the nation state, they came to think and talk of themselves as they never had before: as members of this or that closed group, this or that tribe.

Empirically we know that precolonial social units were rarely, if ever, as rigid, insular, and mutually antagonistic as terms like “tribe” and “tribalism” suggest. Rather, they were dynamic and diverse, marked by porous boundaries and constant change. And yet, today’s colloquial understanding of “tribe” remains anthropologists’ erstwhile one—partially, it seems, because the term has gained so much traction, not least among other social scientists.

Psychologists in particular tend to see “tribalism” as intrinsic to the human condition, as hardwired into our psyche as an inheritance from our earliest African ancestry. Here is a quote representing this view: “Homo sapiens spent much of its evolutionary history in small bands on the African savannah competing with other bands for scarce resources. As a result, tribal competition is written into our DNA.”5

Studies show that humans have long put at least as much energy into forging alliances and seeking new terrain as they have into closing ranks and bearing arms.

It may well be human nature to divide the world between “us” and “them,” and to seek solidarity within an in-group for the purpose of competing with an out-group. But the essentialist manner in which warring identities are attributed to our species’ earliest origins in Africa ignores a wealth of research on prestate societies, including those in Africa. Such studies show that humans have long put at least as much energy into forging alliances and seeking new terrain as they have into closing ranks and bearing arms.

Consider, for example, the research on religion and religious change that I have conducted during my time among the Makhuwa. Migration is a central part of their lives and of their origins. Beginning on the sacred mountain, Mount Namuli, the earliest of their ancestors descended the slopes and spread to other regions of what is today northern Mozambique. Each time they crossed a river, the myth goes, one group encamped and settled there, while others crossed the river and carried on. The history of the Makhuwa is a history of crossings and dwellings.

Movement continued serving for the Makhuwa as a strategy for coping with hardships—droughts and floods, diseases and disputes, slave raiders and state builders. In all these cases, the response of the Makhuwa was rarely to fight back; it was more often to flee. Such flight, especially in response to the containment strategies of colonizers and other would-be rulers, is one of what the late political anthropologist James Scott called “weapons of the weak”—moving as a means of resisting when open combat is not an option.6

During my initial fieldwork, I was often puzzled by the refusal of many villagers to construct their homes with sturdy materials—clay bricks and corrugated zinc—as political leaders and development workers had urged them to do. Many opted for simple mud, bamboo, and thatch. These “mud huts,” as we would call them, present obvious problems. They collapse, easily, in the rains. As such, they must be continually refurbished, or else abandoned.

Photo of a mud hut being constructed

Courtesy Devaka Premawardhana.

But I came to learn that this may just be the point. Unlike modern constructions, mud huts are easy to build—they can be completed in a day. And because the sunk costs of building them are negligible, they are not only quickly built, they are painlessly abandoned. They are architecture for the fleet-footed.

It is interesting that the district administrator in the area where I worked, hoping to see his territory “develop” and “modernize,” once confided in me that his biggest challenge is that the local population is “too mobile.” They live like nomads, he complained. But what for him was a marker of primitivism was experienced by the Makhuwa themselves as a capacity—a strategic adaptation to the inevitability of facing circumstances otherwise beyond their control.

To be sure, it is not that those I work with lack interest in feeling at home, or even in being rooted. It is rather that they see roots more the way we see routes. The Makhuwa word for roots—mikakari—is used interchangeably with the word for veins—misempha—because roots and veins share the same function. They circulate the life source, whether blood or soil nutrients, through us. And that, in turn, allows us to circulate: to move, to dance, to live. Roots, in this conception, do not just stabilize us. They mobilize us.

This idea finds expression in the writings of some of Africa’s foremost thought leaders—in Achille Mbembe’s claim that identity in Africa is identity in motion, and in Chinua Achebe’s words: “The world is like a Mask dancing. If you want to see it well, you do not stand in one place.”7 Most revealing about this proverb from Achebe’s Igbo people is that it compels one beyond Igbo parochialism not in spite of but because of one’s grounding in Igbo proverbial wisdom. To be rooted, in this case, is to reach out as much as it is to reach down.

It is perhaps in the realm of religion that mobility and fluidity most come into play. We often think of religious affiliations as master categories that preordain one’s entire faith and practice, and religions do often put themselves out there as all-encompassing life programs. Yet what is also true about religion for most people is that it functions not primarily as an intellectual system, but rather as a means of confronting our most concrete and pressing problems. The pragmatic qualities of religion, especially in places like northern Mozambique where medical facilities are scarce, give rise to an eclectic and experimental way of being.

When health clinics are absent, you go to the traditional healer. If that healer fails to cure you, you seek out another—or a church, or a mosque, or a different church, or a different mosque. What matters is not logical consistency or abstract truth. What matters is life. As the psychologist James Leuba put it (in words well known to us thanks to William James): “Does God really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion.”8

The priority the Makhuwa give to existential imperatives over abstract ideals proves enormously frustrating to the evangelists of the new Pentecostal churches spreading rapidly throughout Africa. These churches enjoin their worshippers to convert by making an absolute break with the past, which requires them to denounce and even to demonize their ancestors and ancestral traditions. Yet for the Makhuwa, it has always been the case that converting to something need not mean converting from something else—particularly when life is on the line.

In northern Mozambique, as in much of Africa, the self is constituted by the other.

Conveyed in this kind of religious mobility is a comfort with and even a delight in difference—in engaging that which lies beyond the borders that conventionally constrain us. In northern Mozambique, as in much of Africa, the self is constituted by the other. As the well-known concept of Ubuntu has it, “a person is a person through other persons.” The logic here is not the Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” but rather “I am because we are.”

This notion of the relational self was championed by the late South African archbishop Desmond Tutu.9 That he campaigned as a faith leader both against apartheid and, later, for reconciliation shows how religion can be a resource for promoting openness and respect, for affirming what Rabbi Jonathan Sacks called “the dignity of difference.”10 In all these ways, we see religion—sometimes assumed to be essentially acrimonious—to be at least as much a resource for pluralism and peace, and a resource for getting past the polarization of our times.

 

What has emerged—especially among progressives—as a formidable obstacle to coexistence in twenty-first-century America is the politics of identity, or more precisely a hyperconsciousness about identities, narrowly defined and increasingly invoked to shame, blame, and exclude people who do not think or act in the right way. There is a positive side to identity politics: whether racial, religious, gender, ethnic, or national, identities can be mobilized as a source of personal meaning and political action. At its best, identity politics provides beleaguered people a spiritually uplifting and materially empowering sense of shared identity, a potent resource for countering discrimination and disadvantage.

But as with anything positive, there is also a shadow side. Identity thinking can play up differences and discontinuities to such an extent that we lose sight of our common humanity; it can lead well-meaning people to self-censor and hold back for fear of saying something insensitive that might be deemed bigoted; it can cause us to forgo opportunities for engaging other cultures because we worry that our appreciation will be construed as appropriation.

The psychologists Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt make a helpful distinction between what they call “common humanity identity politics” and “common enemy identity politics.”11 Their example of the former is Martin Luther King Jr., who devoted himself to ensuring that Black Americans not be denied dignity or rights on account of their race. In this, King was concerned with the particularities of group identity, yes. But to make his case, he appealed to the shared moral identities of all Americans and did so by using unifying language—referring, for example, to people of all races and religions as brothers and sisters.

By contrast, common enemy identity politics mobilizes identity not to fortify our overarching humanity but rather to unify an in-group around opposition to an out-group. This version of identity politics traffics in its own reifications and reductionisms. It can be, and often is, exclusionary and divisive.

Illustration of a chasm between two groups of silhouettes

Illustration by Kristie Welsh

 

Underlying common enemy identity politics is a basic epistemic error, one which the philosopher Theodor Adorno termed “identity thinking”: the tendency to reduce objects to concepts and the failure to recognize that life is irreducible to the terms with which we seek to grasp it.12 The greatest fallacy in identity thinking is its flawed understanding of the human subject. We are not set pieces or static entities. We are beset with complexities and nuances, inconsistencies and contradictions. We are human becomings at least as much as we are human beings.

If the epitome of common humanity identity politics is Martin Luther King Jr., it may be tempting to take Malcolm X—King’s foil, as he is often presented—as the icon of common enemy identity politics. It was Malcolm X, after all, who spoke of the white man as the devil. Yet Malcolm X underwent multiple conversions in his life—not only to the Nation of Islam, when he changed his name from Malcolm Little to Malcolm X, but also to a more universal, inclusive, and, crucially, multiracial understanding of what it means to be Muslim, at which point he changed his name again, to El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz—an indication of the pivotal role of the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, for his evolving sense of self. It was as a result of this ritual par excellence of—what else?—movement, that Malcolm X came to think things anew and renounce the hatred he previously harbored toward all white people.13

This capacity for reinvention is one of Malcolm X’s most impressive qualities. As he says on the last page of his autobiography, “my whole life has been a chronology of changes.”14

All our lives can be viewed this way. We are more than just the identities we claim or that claim us. The endpoints of our most common binaries—white vs. Black, oppressor vs. oppressed, Global South vs. Global North—rarely reflect the fullness of lived experience. We are continually in flux. We are constantly changing. The question is whether we will embrace this or resist it, build bridges to ease movement or build barriers to keep things in place.

 

One of the real privileges of teaching undergraduates, as I do, is introducing them to the wisdom of Indigenous ways of knowing and being, including those of the Makhuwa. It is striking that what the world despises or simply disregards may very well be precisely what it most needs. Religious studies scholar Philip Arnold calls this the urgency of Indigenous values.15

Another privilege of teaching college students is the chance to encourage them at their pivotal life stage to take seriously that they have their own traditions, backgrounds, histories, and, yes, identities, but to see their identities not as the limit of their inquiry, but as the basis for it. They are not landing pads but launching pads.

The English word “education” comes from the Latin educere, which means “to lead out.” What this usually is taken to mean is movement in the vertical direction, a rising above the mundane to a higher plane that allows one to see things more clearly, more purely, like Plato’s cave-dwellers ascending to see the sun. I prefer to think of the movements worth making as movements on the horizontal plane, as lateral displacements that enable us to consider our own world critically from the vantage point of another. In this way, we learn to see things not from above, but from aside.

My point is not that everyone should go on pilgrimage—or spend time in far-flung corners of the world, as anthropologists like me are privileged to do for a living. Lateral displacements can be made wherever in the world you happen to find yourself. All that is required is curiosity, courtesy, and a willingness to engage people whose backgrounds, perspectives, and life circumstances are different from your own. Increasingly we can find such people on our own streets and in our own communities.

The concern is real that in leaving our comfort zones we might make others uncomfortable. It is the height of hubris to assume those on the margins always care to dialogue with those in the center. But it would also be too bad if we allowed the legitimate concern for others’ autonomy and agency to rationalize our isolation and ignorance.

The Makhuwa show us there is no reason to assume the existence of “tribes” entails insularity within and animosity beyond.

Not everyone, after all, is as “tribal” as we are. In fact, as I hope to have shown, even “tribes” tend not to be as tribal as we are. What Makkhuwa and other Indigenous peoples reveal is that life is predicated not on identity but on mobility, not on our differences but on the common ground we share when we move among each other. If it is true that the Makhuwa are a tribe, they invite us to rethink what is meant by that very word. For the Makhuwa, distinctions and divisions have long featured in everyday life—between the village and the bush, the living and the dead, one ethnicity and another. But as long as these borders have existed, so too have border crossings. Lines drawn to divide can also be used to connect. The Makhuwa show us there is no reason to assume the existence of “tribes” entails insularity within and animosity beyond.

If I may end with a plea, it is that we stop calling our problem in the United States one of tribalism. To call politics in our era “tribal” is to project our own rancor and divisiveness onto societies that have rarely been as polarized as ours. By instead thinking anew about actual Indigenous peoples and opening ourselves to their so-called “tribal” ways, we may stand our best chance of again becoming civil—and maybe even civilized.

Notes:

  1. This essay is adapted from my 2023 lecture at the Chautauqua Institution’s summer assembly. Thanks to fellow HDS graduate Melissa Spas, MTS ’05, for inviting me to present there.
  2. See Geoff Nunberg, “As Fissures Between Political Camps Grow, ‘Tribalism’ Emerges as the Word of 2017,” Fresh Air, NPR, December 6, 2017.
  3. The full interview transcript can be found here: transcripts.cnn.com/show/skc/date/2024-07-14/segment/01 (accessed July 30, 2024).
  4. See Morton H. Fried, The Notion of Tribe (Cummings Publishing Company, 1975).
  5. Daniel Yudkin, “How Political Tribalism Can Be Explained Using Social Science,” The Guardian (March 27, 2018).
  6. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale University Press, 1985).
  7. Achille Mbembe, “Les métaphysiques africaines permettent de penser l’identité en mouvement,” Le Monde, December 15, 2019; Chinua Achebe, Arrow of God (Heinemann, 1964), 46.
  8. Leuba is quoted in William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (The Modern Library, 1902), 497.
  9. See Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Pilgrim Press, 1997).
  10. Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (Continuum, 2002).
  11. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure (Penguin Press, 2018), 53–80.
  12. See Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (Macmillan, 1978), and Michael Jackson, Critique of Identity Thinking (Berghahn, 2019).
  13. As he wrote in a letter home: “In the past I permitted myself to be used . . . to make sweeping indictments of all white people, the entire white race. . . . Because of the spiritual enlightenment which I was blessed to receive as the result of my recent pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca, I no longer subscribe to sweeping indictments of any one race. I wish nothing but freedom, justice, and equality . . . for all people.” Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (Ballantine Books, 1965), 416.
  14. Ibid., 438.
  15. Philip P. Arnold, The Urgency of Indigenous Values (Syracuse University Press, 2023).

Devaka Premawardhana, MDiv ’05, is Winship Distinguished Research Associate Professor of Religion at Emory University. His books include the prize-winning Faith in Flux: Pentecostalism and Mobility in Rural Mozambique (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018) and the edited volume Between Life and Thought: Existential Anthropology and the Study of Religion (University of Toronto Press, 2024).

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